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Abstract: Defending ﬁrst-person introspective access to own mental
states, we argue against Carruthers’ claim of mindreading being prior
to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we
understand our own and others’ mental states. We conclude that a
model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of
access for self and other is sufﬁcient and more consistent with the
evidence.
Making a case for introspection. Comparing four different
accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading
(meta-representing mental states of others) and ﬁrst-person
metacognition (meta-representing one’s own mental states),
Carruthers concludes that the capacity to mindread is prior
to metacognition. According to him, basic mindreading is
either turned upon others or turned upon ourselves, the latter
constituting metacognition. Mindreading is thus the capacity to
interpret the other or the self and therefore does not require
introspection.
This brings us to the core problem of our critique: Assuming
that there is one basic meta-representational mechanism that
underlies both understanding the self and other, how can this
mechanism be characterized?
In what follows, our analysis hinges on the way Carruthers uses
the term introspection in relation to basic mindreading. Most
accounts of mindreading use introspection to describe a special
kind of access that we have to ourselves that is not available for
third-person mindreading.
Carruthers’ account dispenses with this difference of access
and the function of introspection. He gives a negative deﬁnition
of introspection as “any reliable method for forming beliefs about
one’s own mental states that is not self-interpretative and that
differs in kind from the ways in which we form beliefs about
the mental states of other people” (sect. 1.4, para. 3, emphasis
in original). Yet, in his architecture of the mind, there is no
place for an introspective capacity constituting an immediate
and direct inner perception of a belief. This conclusion results
from Carruthers’ extreme caution about the phenomenology
that characterizes introspection and his dismissal of it as
misleading.
This thesis of the unreliability of introspection and the neces-
sity to dismiss it as a mode of access to beliefs is supported by
data from confabulation and commissurotomy. However, this
does not show that one cannot know one’s beliefs to be true.
We don’t necessarily have to concede that beliefs are – or can
become – consciously uninterpreted; instead we can assume that
there are unconscious belief attitudes that can give rise to a con-
scious event whose content is a belief. In cases of confabulation,
this doesn’t mean, however, that we are not introspecting this
event; it simply means that there is a discrepancy with the under-
lying belief attitudes.
So, the data suggests that there are mental processes that we
are not conscious of. This is not a principled argument against
introspective access to our own mental states that is independent
of lengthy interpretation. The scope and quality of self-
knowledge is limited, whether it is gained by introspection or
by self-interpretation. Commissurotomy patients mistake their
beliefs for certain actions, yet they do so also under an account
of self-interpretation. Self-knowledge and its acquisition by intro-
spection has certainly been overrated in philosophy, but the
limitations are equal for self-interpretation.
Aside from this – although he claims that according to his
account of mindreading applied to the self, there is “no . . .
awareness of one’s own propositional attitudes independently
of any perceptually accessible cues that provide a basis for
self-interpretation” (sect. 1.4, para. 2) – Carruthers does not
completely differentiate introspection and self-interpretation
according to his mindreading account and does concede
there sometimes seem to be introspective qualities during
self-interpretation, such as immediacy and effortlessness
(sect. 8, para. 3).
So the question still remains of how best to characterize the
access we have to ourselves. Contrary to Carruthers, we would
like to argue that the immediacy and directness that characterizes
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this is not a conscious interpretational endeavour. Just as with
the perception of the outside world, our brain makes “uncon-
scious inferences” (von Helmholtz 1866) when perceiving our-
selves. This is the basis for the experience that introspection is
direct and immediate. The same immediacy also occurs when
perceiving others(Frith 2007).Nevertheless, there is a difference
between the way we meta-represent our own and the mental
states of others. When thinking of ourselves, there are more
data available, that is, visceral and somaesthetic sensations in
addition to a richer knowledge of our own past history. Thus,
we are dealing with the same mechanism but with two different
modes, one for the self and one for the other. This corresponds to
Carruthers’ model 2 account.
It accordingly also does not matter whether the mechanism
evolved ﬁrst for understanding others or for understanding
oneself. We assume both involve the same underlying mechan-
ism of meta-representation that, endowed with additional
sources of information, makes up the different modes of access.
Another point of criticism against a mindreading is prior account
is that the mechanism of mindreading is third-person directed.
Thus, when I direct my mindreading capacity upon myself,
I should use a third-person stance. Apart from being an interpret-
ativeprocess,thisisalsoanunnecessarilycomplexandcomputation-
allyexpensivewayofaccessingtheself.Itcanbearguedthatthebest
explanation is to simply accept the immediate ﬁrst-person data
instead of adopting the complex third-person setup.
A further argument for introspection as a speciﬁc mode of
access for the self comes from considering why it might be valu-
able for survival: (1) we can inform others about our reasons for
acting in a certain way; (2) we can gain high-level control of our
emotion and our behaviour (e.g., Zelazo 2004). Take, for
example, a simple learning process. We can learn associations
between stimuli even when the stimuli are presented sublimin-
ally (i.e., not available to introspection). However, this learning
is slow and gradual. If the stimuli are supraliminal, then insightful
learning becomes possible through introspection. At some point
subjects notice the contingency and will immediately jump to
100% performance (Pessiglione et al., in press).
Contrary to Carruthers, we prefer his model 2 that makes use of
onemechanismbutinvolvestwodifferentkindsofaccess:onewhich
is perception-based for interpreting others, and additional intro-
spective access which is available when assessing one’s own
mental states. Altogether, model 2 is more consistent and parsimo-
nious.Italsomakesbetterpredictionsforpathologiessuchasautism
and schizophrenia in which both kinds of access are impaired.
Insum,thisdiscussionexempliﬁesthatthe understandingofhow
self and other are related is an important topic for research that is
generating exciting new empirical and theoretical investigations.
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